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BOOK REVIEWS

STRATEGY IN MANY FORMS
Phase Line Attila: The Amphibious Campaign for Cyprus, 1974, by Edward J. Erickson and Mesut
Uyar. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Univ. Press, 2020. 235 pages. Free hardcover and e-book.

Although a wealth of scholarly literature
exists on various political, military,
intelligence, and intercultural aspects of
the 1974 Cyprus crisis, an authoritative
English-language history of the actual
Turkish campaign and Greek Cypriot
resistance was lacking heretofore. Now,
Phase Line Attila assesses Turkey’s July–
August 1974 invasion of Cyprus, an
operation officially dubbed YILDIZATMA 4 (STAR-DROP 4); this was the
fourth revision of an invasion plan drawn
up in 1970. The book is recommended
for anyone interested in either eastern
Mediterranean military history in
particular or the strategies and tactics of
modern amphibious assaults in general.

then narrate events chronologically, beginning with discussion of a simmering
crisis from the 1940s (when Cyprus was
still a British colony) through independence in 1960 and the gradual increase
in tensions between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots, as well as between Greece and
Turkey themselves, both of which were
under military governments during
parts of the 1960s and early 1970s. This
retelling is supported by eleven tables on
air, land, and naval deployments, plus
twelve maps of the operational zones of
the time. This cumulative presentation
will be very helpful for academics
desiring visual accompaniments for
teaching the military campaign.

The authors of Phase Line Attila are
eminently qualified for the project.
Dr. Edward J. Erickson is a retired U.S.
Army officer and noted historian of
the late Ottoman and early Turkish
militaries. His coauthor, Dr. Mesut Uyar,
is dean of the School of Business and
Social Sciences, Antalya Bilim University, and a retired Turkish army officer.

The book does come with certain
caveats—which are somewhat paradoxical. While the authors generally are
objective and remind readers that other
works also should be consulted for a
wider appreciation of the Cyprus crisis,
their attempt to limit their treatment
strictly to military history does not
succeed entirely. Where encountered,
this is more a sin of omission than
anything worse. This is because of the
still extremely controversial nature of
the military operation itself, which made

Structurally, the book begins with
introductory background material on
other examples of post–World War II
amphibious assaults. Its eight chapters
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Turkey an international pariah, including incurring a U.S. arms export ban that
lasted until 1978. In effect, the authors
have written an apologia for Turkey’s
intervention, emphasizing the elements
of strategic genius and battlefield
bravery necessary for them to make the
case for it as a model military operation.
While there certainly is some truth
to the depictions, the authors never
critically assess the likelihood of Cyprus
uniting with Greece, as no great powers
of the time would have allowed this,
and Greeks themselves were divided
on it. Nevertheless—as the authors
note—the Greek Cypriot military coup
that overthrew Archbishop Makarios
in 1974 provided Turkey with a useful
pretext for its long-planned invasion,
as it could point to the 1960 treaty
negotiated among itself, Greece, and
Britain, which stipulated that these
guarantor powers of Cypriot independence could prevent the island from
uniting with another country. So, if
the truism holds that every battle is
over before it has been fought, it can be
said that the British-led negotiations
created a military confrontation that
only required time to be fulfilled. A
similar omission is the lack of detailed
discussion of Turkish or Turkish
Cypriot leaders and their contributions.
Perhaps the most baffling omission is
the book’s lack of critical inquiry regarding what happened—and why. Many
historians, especially Greek ones, have
suspected tacit Anglo-American support
for the Turkish invasion as a way to solve
the island’s pesky interethnic issues—
even if it meant a potentially disastrous
rift within NATO. Of course, the British
military also retained two sovereign base
areas and an important signals facility,
so it would be laughable to presume that
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both it and the UN, which had had a
peacekeeping mission in place since the
early 1960s, could be caught off guard.
Nevertheless, this is what the authors
claim: that the Turkish military used the
element of surprise, along with overwhelming air superiority, to defeat the
well-entrenched Greek Cypriot resistance. Nowhere do they ask why Greece
reacted so weakly, or whether it was
possible that certain individuals (such
as the deposed Makarios) had sold out
the country. In any case, Greece already
had pulled out the bulk of its military in
the mid-1960s, whereas Turkey had not.
The major surprise of the campaign was
the choice of landing beaches. Whereas
the Greek Cypriots (and, according
to the authors, Henry Kissinger) had
believed the intelligence of a Turkish
defector that pointed to one location,
the actual Turkish landing took place
at another port, with only ghost vessels
sent toward the former. The authors
mention this as a point of fact, but
again they ask no further questions that
could lead to even more interesting
findings—for example, to confirm
whether the informant was indeed an
actual defector or just someone sent to
provide the enemy with disinformation.
However, this is the kind of conundrum
the reader is happy to encounter. The
presence of such conundrums in the
work speaks to the level of detail the
authors have presented—on strategy,
tactics, and the vital ground-level information on troop movements—that fuels
and inspires further research. While
Phase Line Attila sometimes is a onesided work, it is a necessary one for anyone interested in Cyprus or the history of
amphibious assaults in the modern age.
CHRIS DELISO
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